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Abstract
Regional convergence stands out in the severe adjustment of the Portuguese
economy that followed the international financial crisis. This result contrasts with
increasing regional inequality in other European countries. We show that regions’
GDP growth rates of the Portuguese economy were driven by debt and exports.
Our estimates suggest that differences in regional debt-to-GDP and exports-to-
GDP ratios resulted in asymmetric regional economic dynamics. Highly indebted
regions had a more severe recession and a slower recovery. Regions more open to
trade had a milder recession and a stronger recovery. Finally, our results suggest
that fiscal decentralization may improve regions’ resilience.
Keywords: regional development, economic convergence, debt, exports, local
government, fiscal decentralization, resilience, international financial crisis, Eurozone
crisis.
JEL Classification: E32, E44, F34, H63, H71, H72, R11, R51
1 Introduction
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the spatial impact of the
international financial crisis and of the Eurozone crisis. In the 2008-2016 recession and
recovery cycle of the Portuguese economy, aggregate divergence in real GDP per capita
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relative to the EU–28 coincided with strong regional convergence. This result contrasts
with regional economic divergence in most European countries, namely in the ones that
were most affected by the international financial crisis and by the Eurozone crisis - see,
for example, OECD (2018). We expect that by identifying the main determinants of
the asymmetric regional dynamics of the Portuguese economy we may contribute to a
better understanding of the regional effects of financial crisis and to contribute to the
design of policies that enhance the resilience of regions and countries.
The Portuguese crisis was a debt crisis. Corroborating the predictions based on
historical evidence on financial crisis – see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) –,
the adjustment process (which included a bail out by the International Monetary Fund,
the European Commission and the European Central Bank, aka troika, in June 2011)
featured a deep recession, that reached a trough in the beginning of 2013. The expan-
sion that followed was very slow and fragile. As a result, between 2008 and 2016, the
Portuguese economy has diverged from European Union (EU–28) real GDP. However,
during the cycle of recession and recovery (2008–2016), the Portuguese economy regis-
tered the greatest decrease in regional GDP inequalities in the EU–28. The coincidence
of an aggregate divergence in real GDP relative to the EU–28 with a strong regional
GDP convergence was the main motivation for writing this paper.
The huge increase in the indebtedness of the Portuguese economy was asymmetri-
cally distributed across regions. The results of a new research avenue on the impact
of financial crises suggest that regions with higher debt to income ratios are expected
to suffer deeper and longer recessions and weaker expansions, due to a strong con-
traction in the consumption of durables – see, for example, Mian and Sufi (2016).
Therefore, an asymmetric distribution of debt across regions is expected to affect the
impact of the jump in interest rates that followed the sudden-stop of capital inflows
to the Portuguese economy during the international financial crisis and the Eurozone
crisis. Counter-cyclical measures that could reduce the external finance premium of the
Portuguese economy and cushion the impact of the financial crisis depended on the Eu-
ropean Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy decisions. However, in its decisions, the
ECB should not take into consideration the economic conditions of specific Eurozone
countries, and certainly not of specific regions within individual countries. Therefore,
more indebted regions could not expect to be helped by ECB counter-cyclical policies.
In this context, regions with higher debt to GDP ratios should suffer the most from
shocks in financial markets, namely through a higher reduction in households’ consump-
tion and firms’ investment. These predictions, which correspond to our first testable
hypothesis, are corroborated by the estimates presented in this paper.
Large capital inflows from other Eurozone countries reflected large current account
deficits and translated into a very negative net international investment position, that
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surpassed 100% of GDP in 2008. The allocation of those capital flows to low productiv-
ity growth non-tradable sectors – e.g., housing, real estate, retail and public consump-
tion – has been mentioned as one of the main causes of the low growth regime of the
Portuguese economy in the 21st century – see, for example, Reis (2013) and Alexandre
et al. (2016). Additionally, the growth of non-tradables inflated costs contributed to
the deterioration of external competitiveness. In the context of a deep contraction of
domestic demand, the growth of exports became a priority, both as an engine of eco-
nomic growth and as way to restore external balance. Although within the Eurozone
an exchange rate devaluation was not an option to boost external competitiveness, the
adjustment process has led to a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate. This
improvement in the economy’s competitiveness was visible in the increasing weight of
exports on GDP, which rose from 30% in 2010 to 43% in 2016. We hypothesize that
the impact of the real exchange rate depreciation is expected to have favored economic
growth in regions with a higher weight of tradables sectors, that is, more open to in-
ternational trade. In fact, the estimates presented in this paper corroborate our second
testable hypothesis, showing that regions with a higher weight of exports on GDP have
had a milder recession and a stronger recovery.
Asymmetries in debt-to-GDP ratios and in sectoral specialization (namely, in the
weight of exports on GDP) may lead to idiosyncratic regional business cycles - e.g.,
Groot et al. (2011). Economic theory suggests that in this case regional policies may
foster the resilience of regions to shocks - see, for example, Martin et al. (2016). The
resilience and the reaction of regions to recessions, namely to the Great Recession of
2008, has drawn the attention of researchers – see, for example, Martin et al. (2016)
and Bailey and Berkeley (2014). Global trends and the accelerated technological trans-
formation demand policies adapted to specific realities - e.g., OECD (2018) - and, also,
more flexible local governments to implement strategies that improve their competi-
tiveness and that protect them from idiosyncratic shocks.
Portugal is a very centralized country, with a very low weight of local governments
expenditures on total government expenditure. Therefore, local governments have a
very small share of resources at their disposal to define and build regionally fitted
polices. Additionally, the very high public debt and budget deficits imposed a very
demanding fiscal consolidation process. This resulted in a strong decrease of transfers
to local governments, reducing even further the scope for the implementation of locally
defined measures aimed at enhancing the resilience of regions to economic shocks. In this
context, local governments were left with the option of increasing their own revenues,
that is, revenues that depend on the level of economic activity and on municipalities’
policy choices. Notwithstanding, our third testable hypothesis is that own revenues help
regions to insulate from shocks. The empirical results presented in this paper suggest
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that the weight of own revenues on total revenues of municipalities have a positive
impact on regions’ economic growth.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the main facts on the
macroeconomic and regional economic growth of the Portuguese economy in the period
that followed the international financial crisis of 2008. In section 3, we discuss the
potential role of two important drivers of the economic and financial crisis and of the
recovery that followed, namely debt and exports, and describe their asymmetric regional
distribution. In section 4, we show the differences in sectoral specialization of regions,
its implications for idiosyncratic regional business cycles and we discuss the role of fiscal
autonomy in insulating regions from shocks. In section 5, we present the econometric
strategy used to test our three hypotheses, the data and the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Aggregate divergence and regional convergence
The international financial crisis of 2008 resulted in the greatest GDP contraction in
developed countries since the Great Depression of the 1930s. In Table 1, we present
the data for real GDP growth rates in several European Union (EU–28) countries, for
the periods 2008–2012 and 2008–2016. According to the Center for Economic Policy
Research business cycle dating for the euro area, the 1st quarter of 2008 marks the
peak of the business cycle before the international financial crisis and the 1st quarter of
2013 marks the trough of the business cycle after the recession originated by the Euro
sovereign debt crisis.1 Portugal belongs to the group of countries with the deepest
recession, having had a 12% drop in real GDP between 2008 and 2012, only surpassed
by Greece (-29%) and Spain (-13%). During the recession in the Eurozone, real GDP
in the EU–28 decreased by 6%, 2% in France, 7% in the United Kingdom, whereas in
Germany real GDP has increased by 1%.
During the expansion phase of the economic cycle, the Portuguese economy was also
in the group with the slowest recovery among EU–28. By 2016 real GDP was still 5%
below its 2008 level. In the period 2008-2016, only Greece (-33%), Spain (-7%) and Italy
(-7%) had a worse performance, whereas real GDP in the EU–28 and in Germany was
already 2% and 12% higher, respectively, than in 2008. As a result, between 2008 and
2016, the Portuguese real GDP per capita, as a percentage of the EU–28, decreased from
81% to 77%, hitting a minimum of 75% in 2012. Therefore, the period beginning with
the international financial crisis of 2008 was a period of aggregate economic divergence
relative to EU–28.
In Table 1, in order to describe the evolution of regional convergence in the period
1Between March 2009 and October 2010 there was a very short-lived expansion. For more details,
see https://cepr.org/content/euro-area-business-cycle-dating-committee.
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Table 1: GDP growth and regional convergence
Country
∆ GDP (2015 prices) Coefficient of variation,
NUTS III regions
2008–2012 2008–2016 2008 2015 ∆ 2008–2015
Portugal -12% -5% 0.25 0.22 -12%
Greece -29% -33% 0.30 0.30 1%
Spain -13% -7% 0.20 0.21 7%
Italy -9% -7% 0.26 0.27 4%
EU–28 -6% 2%
Germany 1% 12% 0.40 0.39 -2%
France -2% 3% 0.35 0.37 6%
United Kingdom -7% 2% 1.00 1.07 7%
Source: Own computations using data from Eurostat. The coefficient of vari-
ation of regional (NUTS III) real GDP per capita is computed as the within
year standard-deviation of real GDP per capita divided by its mean across the
regions. GDP per capita data was only available until 2015. ∆ stands for vari-
ation.
2008–2015, we present data for the coefficient of variation for 2008 and 2015,2 using
NUTS III regions real GDP per capita.3 The results show that Portugal stands out as
the only bailed out economy that has registered a strong decrease in regional income
inequality (-12%). According to the coefficient of variation, Greece (1%), Spain (7%)
and Italy (4%) have all increased the dispersion of income across regions in the period
following the international financial crisis.4
In fact, Fratesi and Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2016), Iammarino et al. (2018) and the Euro-
pean Commission (2017), among others, have noticed an increase in regional income
inequality in several countries in the aftermath of the international financial crisis.
However, the evolution of regional inequalities with the business cycle differ across time
and space. Groot et al. (2011), for example, shows heterogeneous spatial effects of the
international financial crisis, as a result of differences in the openness to trade, financial
markets, institutions and in the sectoral composition of countries and regions. Greece
seems to be a good example of the difficulties in establishing a relation between the
evolution of regional disparities and the business cycle. Petrakos et al. (2005) conclude
that regional inequalities in Greece increased during periods of economic growth and
decreased during recessions. However, this result contrasts with the conclusions pre-
2The coefficient of variation measures σ –convergence, that is, the evolution of the dispersion of
real GDP per capita across regions. In section 5, we evaluate β –convergence, that is, the partial
correlation between growth in real GDP per capita over time and its initial level, through regression
analysis.
3NUTS is the European Union nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided
into three NUTS I regions (Mainland, Azores and Madeira), seven NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS
III regions. Each NUTS III region aggregates several municipalities. Statistics describing NUTS III
regions, namely GDP per capita, share in total GDP and population, population density and the
number of municipalities, can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
4Computations for the Gini Index confirm the results from the coefficient of variation.
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Figure 1: ∆ Coefficient of variation NUTS III regions (2008 – 2015), EU countries
sented in Petrakos and Psycharis (2015). These authors, in an analysis of the spatial
impact of the recent financial and economic crisis in Greece, conclude that regional
disparities increased. Therefore, even when dealing with the impact of a global inter-
national financial crisis and crisis in the Eurozone, we have to be very carefull in the
analysis of the specific conditions of each country.
To describe the evolution of regional GDP per capita inequality, we have computed
the coefficient of variation for NUTS III regions real GDP per capita in 26 EU countries,
between 2008 and 2015 – see Figure 1.5 Data in Figure 1 show that, between 2008
and 2015, 14 out of the 25 EU countries had an increase in regional GDP per capita
dispersion: Sweden, Hungary, Estonia and Denmark present the highest increase in the
coefficient of variation – all above 10%. On the other hand, 11 countries have had a
decrease in regional GDP inequality after 2008 (although Netherlands, Belgium and
Romania have registered a very small decrease in the coefficient of variation). These
results show that Portugal stands out has the country with the highest decrease in
the coefficient of variation, in the period 2008–2015. That is, during the economic
5We excluded Cyprus and Luxembourg from our analysis because they only have one NUT III
region.
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and financial crisis and in its aftermath, the aggregate divergence of the Portuguese
economy coincided with regional economic convergence.
Table 2: GDP per capita growth rate, NUTS III (2015 prices)
2008–2012 2012–2016 2008–2016
Portugal -12% 11% -2%
Baixo Alentejo 0% 9% 9%
Douro -2% 14% 12%
Terras de Tra´s-os-Montes -9% 18% 7%
Alto Taˆmega -5% 10% 4%
Alentejo Litoral -17% 29% 7%
Alto Minho -2% 14% 11%
Taˆmega e Sousa -6% 14% 7%
Beira Baixa 4% 4% 9%
Beiras e Serra da Estrela -6% 17% 10%
Ca´vado -9% 15% 5%
Ave -4% 20% 15%
Viseu Da˜o Lafo˜es -9% 10% 1%
Alto Alentejo -11% 18% 5%
Regia˜o de Coimbra -9% 11% 1%
Algarve -17% 16% -3%
Regia˜o de Leiria -11% 14% 1%
Regia˜o de Aveiro -10% 15% 3%
Me´dio Tejo -9% 11% 1%
AM Porto -12% 12% -2%
Oeste -12% 12% -2%
AM Lisboa -15% 5% -10%
Lez´ıria do Tejo -15% 10% -6%
Alentejo Central -11% 12% 0%
Source: Own computations using data from INE.
For a better understanding of the regional economic dynamics during the crisis
and its aftermath, Table 2 presents the data for real GDP per capita growth of the
Portuguese economy and its 23 NUTS III regions, for the periods 2008–2012, 2012–
2016 and 2008–2016.6 In the period 2008-2016, real GDP per capita decreased by 2%,
as a result of the -12% fall in the recession and the 11% increase in the expansion phase.
6In our analysis we exclude the regions of Madeira and Ac¸ores, because their insular economies
are very specific. In the Appendix, Table A1, we describe the main features of the 23 NUTS III
regions. There are substantial disparities across the geographical units. The share of both GDP and
population ranges between 1% and 36%. AM Lisboa, which includes the Portuguese capital, stands
out as the most relevant unit; 36% of GDP and 27% of population, with a population density above
1,000. It is followed by AM Porto, with 16% of the national GDP, 17% of its population, and the
highest population density (above 800). The two geographical units are similar in terms of number
of cities with a population above fifty thousand inhabitants, and in number of municipalities. AM
Porto has a substantial higher number of parishes; 173 compared with 118 in AM Lisboa. The NUTS
III that follow AM Lisboa and AM Porto are Algarve, Ca´vado, Ave, Regia˜o de Aveiro and Regia˜o de
Coimbra, with a share in national GDP bounded between 3% and 4%; the population share is between
2% and 4%. On the lower size extreme, are Alto Taˆmega, Terras de Tra´s-os-Montes, Beira Baixa and
Alto Alentejo.
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In 2016, there were five regions with a lower real GDP per capita than in 2008: Algarve
(-3%), A´rea Metropolitana do Porto (AM Porto) (-2%), Oeste (-2%), Lez´ıria do Tejo
(-6%) and A´rea Metropolitana de Lisboa (AM Lisboa) (-10%). On the other hand, the
highest GDP growth per capita was in the regions of Ave (15%), Douro (12%) and Alto
Minho (11%).
Table 2 also shows that regional real GDP per capita growth patterns were very
diverse, both in the recession and in the recovery periods. On the one hand, some
regions had a much more severe recession than others: in Alentejo Litoral (-17%),
Algarve (-17%), Leziria do Tejo (-15%) and AM Lisboa (-15%) real GDP per capita
decreased more than the average of the national economy (-12%). On the other hand,
some regions, like Douro (-2%), Alto Minho (-2%) or Ave (-4%), had much milder
recessions.
In 2013, the Portuguese economy entered a slow but steady path of recovery, leading
to an increase of 11% in real GDP per capita, between 2012–2016. However, as in the
recession, the economic recovery was asymmetric across regions. Some regions have had
a much stronger recovery, with higher than average real GDP per capita growth rates:
Alentejo Litoral (+29%), Ave (+20%), Alto Minho and Taˆmega e Sousa (+14%). On
the other hand, six regions have had lower than average growth rates of real GDP per
capita between 2012–2016: Alto Taˆmega (10%), Viseu Da˜o Lafo˜es (10%), Leziria do
Tejo (10%), Baixo Alentejo (9%), AM Lisboa (5%) and Beira Baixa (4%). Once again,
the AM Lisboa region stands out as the one with the lowest real GDP per capita growth
rate during the recovery period.
The AM Lisboa region, the richest Portuguese region, which accounted for 36% of
aggregate GDP in 2016 (38% in 2009, that is, a decrease of about 5% in its share),
stands out as the region with the worst economic performance of all regions in the
period 2008-2016. The decrease in the share of the capital city region’s contribution to
the national GDP contrasts with the increasing economic importance of OECD capital
regions - e.g., OECD (2018).7 As a result of that disappointing performance, real GDP
per capita of the AM Lisboa region decreased from 143% of the national average, in
2008, to 132%, in 2016. As shown by Petrakos and Psycharis (2015), this result contrast
with the increasing importance of the region of Athens during the recent financial and
economic crisis, which contributed to an increase in regional inequality in Greece, the
country that suffered the deepest and longest recession.
Overall, regional differences in real GDP per capita were reduced during the reces-
sion, starting in 2008, and during the expansion, starting in 2013, resulting in real GDP
7According to OECD (2018): “A common phenomenon across the OECD is the high and increasing
economic importance of capital regions. On average, they account for more than 26% of national GDP.
The median share of capital city regions’ contribution to their respective country’s GDP increased by
almost 12% (i.e. 2.8 percentage points) between 2000 and 2016.”
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per capita convergence across regions. In the remaining Sections of this paper we will
analyse the drivers of that asymmetric regional dynamics.
3 Debt and openness to trade: regional asymme-
tries
The international financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis were debt crises – see, for
example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Baldwin et al. (2015). The Portuguese crisis
that led to a bail out by troika was also a debt crisis. Debt crises, namely when
they are associated to banking crises, are followed by long and painful adjustment
processes (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Debt was therefore one of the main drivers of
the Portuguese economy in the recession and in the recovery following the international
financial crisis of 2008–2009 and the euro crisis of 2010–2012.
In the context of a debt crisis and a fiscal consolidation process, exports are the
way out of the crisis. The good performance of exports has partially compensated
for the contractionary effects of the decrease in consumption, investment and public
expenditure, contributing to a milder recession and a stronger recovery. Therefore, we
expect regions specialized in non-tradables to suffer deeper and longer recessions and
to have a slower recovery than regions more open to trade. On the other hand, regions
with an economic structure more dependent on domestic and on public spending are
expected to suffer the most from the financial and economic crisis.
In this section, we describe the asymmetric regional distribution of debt and exports
and we discuss its implications for regional economic dynamics during the recession and
recovery of the Portuguese economy.
3.1 Debt
The Portuguese financial and economic crisis followed a long period of stagnation since
the beginning of the 21st century – Blanchard (2007) provides a thorough (and pre-
scient) description of the period before the international financial crisis of 2008–2009.
The accumulation of debt has occurred in the context of low growth and increasing
unemployment, which singles out the Portuguese economy from other Eurozone bailed
out countries: between 2001 and 2008, the average real GDP growth rate was 1.1%,
much lower than growth rates in Spain (3.5%), Greece (4%) and Ireland (5.4%). De-
spite the low GDP growth rates, the debt (sovereign, firms and households) to GDP
ratio increased from 240% in 2001 to over 306% in 2008 (reaching a maximum of 380%
in 2012). In the period 1998–2008, Portugal was the OECD economy with the worst
9
combination of GDP growth and external indebtedness.8
The participation in the European Monetary Union was a regime switch in economic
policy. Since the mid–1990s, interest rates decreased sharply, converging to German
levels – see Figure 2. The creation of the Euro eliminated the exchange rate risk and
reduced drastically the interest rate risk premium, lowering the cost of capital: by
2005, Portuguese 10 year bonds’ yields were equal to Germany’s Treasury rates, having
decreased from 15% in 1990 to 3% in 2005. Low interest rates contributed to the huge
accumulation of debt and capital inflows, reflecting high current account deficits since
the mid–1990s.
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Figure 2: Long term government bond yields – 10 years (%)
In 2008, the negative net international investment position surpassed 100% (it
reached a minimum of -119% in 2014). The international financial crisis and the Euro
crisis made those imbalances look unsustainable, resulting in a sudden-stop and a jump
in the interest rates, from 5% in 2008 to 11% in 2012. In June 2011, the Portuguese
economy was bailed out by troika. High and increasing public debt called for fiscal
consolidation. Expenditure cuts and tax increases had contractionary effects on the
economy, causing a deep recession. The condition of public finances was aggravated by
the banking crisis and the rescue of banks by the State – the ‘diabolic loop’ described
by Reis (2013). The banking crisis made firms’ and households’ borrowing constraints
more stringent – see, for example, Beck et al. (2017). Changes in the ECB monetary
8For a detailed description of the financial imbalances of the Portuguese economy see, for example,
Alexandre, Aguiar-Conraria, Bac¸a˜o and Portela (2017).
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policy in 2012 – signaled by Mario Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes to save the Euro’ speech
– reduced interest rates in the Eurozone: Portugal’s 10 year bond yields decreased to
2% in 2015 (Figure 2).
The high stock of private debt, held both by households and firms, was a burden
for the economy, constraining households’ consumption and firms’ investment – see, for
example, Rodriguez-Palenzuela and Dees (2016) for an analysis of the Eurozone and
Alexandre, Bac¸a˜o, Carreira, Cerejeira, Martins and Portela (2017) for an evaluation
of the impact of financial constraints on firms’ investment decisions in the Portuguese
economy. A new strand of literature has been using microeconomic data to explore the
impact of heterogeneity in households’ debt levels on the economy – e.g., Mian and Sufi
(2010) and Mian and Sufi (2016). These authors conclude that the U.S. counties where
households’ debt increased the most were the most affected by the crisis, having had a
higher contraction in the consumption of durables. In the same vein, studies for the UK
(Bunn and Rostom, 2014) and for Denmark (Andersen et al., 2014), using micro data,
conclude that high levels of households debt have been associated with deeper and longer
recessions and with weaker expansions. These results suggest that the distribution of
debt across regions may affect the adjustment process of their economies, with more
indebted regions having deeper and longer recessions.9
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Figure 3: Debt to GDP ratio, NUTS III regions, 2009 and 2016
We use micro data from the Central Credit Responsibility Database (CCRD), col-
9For a discussion of the real effects of the financial crisis see, for example, Bernanke (2018).
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lected and made available by the Banco de Portugal Microdata Research Laboratory
(BPLIM) (Laborato´rio de Investigac¸a˜o em Microdados do Banco de Portugal). CCRD
collects data on the indebtedness of borrowers (including collective persons, individual
entrepreneurs and private persons) as reported by credit-granting institutions. Among
the information on the indebted individuals (available since 2009) and firms is their
location, which allows us to to build data to describe the regional distribution of house-
holds and firms’ debt and its weight on the GDP of each region – see Figure 3.10 In our
analyis we also consider the debt of municipalities aggregated by NUTS III regions.
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Figure 4: Debt to GDP ratio and GDP per capita, NUTS III regions (2009)
Our data shows a high concentration of private and local governments’ debt in
NUTS III AM Lisboa and AM Porto, amounting to 61% of total debt in 2009 (58% in
2016). Figure 3 shows the debt to GDP ratio for NUTS III regions. Except for Terras
de Tra´s-os-Montes, all regions had a significant reduction in their debt to GDP ratio
between 2009 and 2016. The debt data shows that, in 2009, all regions had a debt
to GDP ratio above 100%. However, there was a great variation in the debt to GDP
ratios across regions, ranging from more than 180% in the regions of Algarve and AM
Lisboa, to 102% in Alentejo Litoral. Between 2009 and 2016, the variation in debt to
GDP ratio was also significant in the different regions. Algarve has had the highest
decrease in this ratio (-61 p.p.), followed by AM Porto, Ave, Ca´vado and Taˆmega e
Sousa, all with a decrease of around 50 p.p.. Figure 4 shows a positive relation between
10For more details on the CCRD database see Banco de Portugal (2018).
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debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP per capita for NUTS III regions, in 2009. This data shows
that the richest regions were the more indebted and, therefore, they were expected to
suffer more with the financial crisis. In this way, indebtedness may have contributed to
regional convergence.
The asymmetric distribution of debt across regions is expected to affect the impact
of the financial crisis on the real economy. Regions where households and firms face
more stringent borrowing constraints are expected to suffer a stronger adjustment in
consumption and investment and, therefore, in their GDP.
3.2 Openness to trade
After a weak performance of exports in the first decade of the 21st century – an average
real growth rate of 3.2% between 2000 and 2008 (and a fall of 16.2% in 2009) –, since
2010, exports have been the main driver of economic activity, with an average real
growth rate of 6.1%, between 2010 and 2016. This strong increase of exports resulted
in an increase in the weight of exports on GDP, from 30% in 2010 to 43% in 2016.
This increase in the weight of tradable sectors is one of the most important structural
transformations of the Portuguese economy in the last decade. The increase of exports
and of its market share may signal the materialization of the medium and long run
gains of trade and specialization from the creation of the European Monetary Union,
mentioned in Krugman (1993). The good performance of exports made an important
contribution to improve the current account from a deficit of around 12% of GDP,
in 2008, to a surplus of around 1%, in 2013. Considering the forecasts for 2018, the
current account will show a surplus for six years in a row, a historical achievement for
the Portuguese economy.
The Eurozone countries cannot boost their exports through currency devaluations,
as exchange rates are irreversibly fixed. The real effective exchange rate is country
specific, given that it depends on each country’s competitiveness conditions, namely
the evolution of labor costs, and on its trading partners’ competitiveness conditions.11
Several authors have shown that real exchange rates are important drivers of the re-
allocation of resources between sectors – e.g., Gourinchas (1998). Economic theory
suggests that the impact of exchange rate movements should depend on the degree of
exposure to international competition – e.g., Klein et al. (2003). Alexandre et al. (2011)
show that exchange rate movements have a larger impact on low-tech sectors and that
open economies specialized in high-tech sectors are more insulated from exchange rate
shocks. Additionally, Alexandre, Bac¸a˜o, Cerejeira and Portela (2017) conclude that
greater labor market rigidity reduces the impact of exchange rate shocks on employ-
11For an analysis of the Portuguese real effective exchange rate see, for example, Alexandre et al.
(2009)
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Figure 5: Portuguese real effective exchange rate, 2010 = 100
ment. Labour market reforms, aiming at more flexibility, were part of troika’s program
of structural reforms – e.g., Blanchard and Portugal (2017). These results suggest that
the Portuguese economy, integrated in the EU–28, having a high share of low- and
medium-low tech sectors and a more flexible labour market should be very exposed to
movements in exchange rates.
Figure 5 shows the Portuguese real effective exchange rate between 1999 and 2016.
In the first years of the Euro, between 1999 and 2005, the real effective exchange rate
has appreciated by 8%. After a period of stabilization, between 2008 and 2015 the
real effective exchange rate has depreciated by 11%. As argued above, the exchange
rate depreciation that followed the international financial crisis should have had a pos-
itive impact on the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy, favoring the growth of
exports. However, the impact of the exchange rate depreciation is expected to have
benefited more the regions more open to international competition or with a higher
weight of exports on its GDP. We therefore expect regions with a productive structure
more oriented to exports to have a milder recession and a more vigorous recovery.
For now, we describe the differences across regions in terms of the weight of exports
on GDP – see Figure 6.12 We use that ratio as a measure of the degree of openness to
international trade. The data shows a wide variation of the ratio of exports to GDP
across regions, varying from a maximum of 107% in Beira Baixa to almost 0% in regions
like Alto Taˆmega, Douro and Algarve. OECD (2018) discusses the role of tradables on
regional economic performance and argue that a higher exposure to international trade
favours convergence. Figure 7 shows a positive relation between the NUTS III regions’
growth rate of exports and GDP per capita growth rate, in the period 2008–2016.
12We should stress a caveat of our measure of openness to trade, namely that exports do not include
tourism.
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Figure 6: Weight of exports on GDP by NUTS III regions, 2008 and 2016
Therefore, differences in the weight of exports to GDP is one dimension of the
asymmetries in the economic structure of regions that may affect regional growth. Those
asymmetries raise challenges for the definition of national level economic policies and for
the definition and implementation of regional and local policies to promote the regions’
international competitiveness. In the next section, we discuss the differences in the
economic structures and asynchronous regional economic cycles and the role of fiscal
decentralization in enhancing regional resilience and growth potential.
4 Asynchronous cycles and regional resilience
In the previous sections we have discussed the impact of aggregate shocks in financial
markets, namely in interest and exchange rates. We have also described differences in
regional debt-to-GDP and exports-to-GDP ratios. The data presented so far suggests
that aggregate shocks may affect regions asymmetrically. In this section, we present
evidence of idiosyncratic regional business cycles and discuss the role of regional policies
in accommodating external shocks and in enhancing the resilience of regions.
4.1 Asynchronous cycles
Differences in regions’ exports-to-GDP ratio, discussed in the previous section, reflect
differences in the degree of specialization across regions – Imbs (2004) shows that a
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higher openness to trade results in higher degrees of specialization. Differences in
economic structures may affect the synchronization of regional business cycles with the
national business cycle.
Figure 8 presents the index of specialization for NUTS III regions, for 2008 and
2016.13 In the construction of the specialization index we have considered the weight of
the sectors in the value added of the economy.14 The higher the index of specialization,
the greater the difference in the sectoral composition of the region relative to the sectoral
composition of the national economy. Figure 8 shows that, in 2016, regions like Algarve
(38%), Ave (37%), Alentejo Litoral (34%), Baixo Alentejo (33%), Taˆmega e Sousa
(33%) and Aveiro (32%) have an index of specialization above 30%. On the other hand,
13The index of specialization is given by
CEi = 1/2
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣∣xikxi − xkx
∣∣∣∣ , CEi ∈ [0, 1[
where i stands for the region and k stands for the sector.
14In 2016, for the aggregate economy, the weights of economic sectors in total value added were
the following: Manufacturing (24.2%), Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and
motorcycles (19.5%), Transporting and storage (7.7%), Administrative and support service activities
(6.7%), Information and Communication (6.5%), Consultancy (6.3%), Construction (6.3%), Accom-
modation and food service activities (5.3%), Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply (5.0%),
Human health and social work activities (3.8%), Real Estate Activities (2.2%), Agriculture (1.8%),
Water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities (1.6%), Arts, entertainment
and recreation (1.2%), Education (0.9%), Mining and quarrying (0.2%) and Other sectors (0.8%).
16
regions like AM Lisboa (17%), Coimbra (16%) and AM Porto (11%) have a much lower
index of specialization, which indicates that they have an economic structure more
similar to the national sectoral composition.
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Figure 8: Index of specialization, NUTS III (%), 2008 and 2016
Those differences in sectoral specialization may result in idiosyncratic regional busi-
ness cycles. To evaluate the regional business cycle synchronization, we computed the
correlations in economic activity, measured by GDP growth rates, for the period 2000
to 2016, between each region and the national economy, subtracting from it the GDP
of the own region. The results, presented in Table 3, show a wide range of correlations,
from a maximum of 0.93 to a minimum of 0.54. Our computations allow the identifica-
tion of three groups of regions. A group where the GDP growth rate correlation with
the national GDP growth rate is equal or under 70%: namely Alto Minho, Baixo Alen-
tejo, Beira Baixa, Alentejo Litoral and Ave. A group that show very high correlations
(above 90%) of regions’ GDP growth with national GDP growth: AM Porto, Algarve,
Coimbra, AM Lisboa and Leiria. Finally, the other 12 regions’ correlation coefficient
lay between 70% a and 90%.
Asynchronous regional business cycles may have implications for the efficacy of na-
tional and regional level economic policies when regions are hit by idiosyncratic shocks.
Next, we discuss the role and scope of regional and local policies in dampening the
regional business cycle.
17
Table 3: Correlation between regions’ and national GDP growth rate, 2000 – 2016
Baixo Alentejo 0.54
Beira Baixa 0.55
Alentejo Litoral 0.56
Ave 0.69
Alto Minho 0.70
Alto Taˆmega 0.72
Alentejo Central 0.73
Alto Alentejo 0.74
Douro 0.78
Lez´ıria do Tejo 0.84
Terras de Tra´s-os-Montes 0.84
Beiras e Serra da Estrela 0.84
Viseu Da˜o Lafo˜es 0.85
Oeste 0.86
Me´dio Tejo 0.86
Regia˜o de Aveiro 0.88
Ca´vado 0.88
Taˆmega e Sousa 0.90
A´rea de Metropolitana do Porto 0.91
Algarve 0.92
Regia˜o de Coimbra 0.92
A´rea Metropolitana de Lisboa 0.92
Regia˜o de Leiria 0.93
Source: Own computations using data
from INE.
4.2 Regional resilience and fiscal decentralization
The international financial crisis returned to the center stage the debate on the contri-
bution of regional policies to strengthen the resilience of regions to shocks. 15 Through-
out the Eurozone crisis, bailed out countries, in the context of high pressure from the
financial markets, had to implement strong fiscal consolidation measures – public ex-
penditures cuts and increases in taxes – that resulted in severe recessions, as described
in Section 2, without a thorough assessment of its impact at the regional level. On the
other hand, ECB monetary policy, a potentially powerful counter-cyclical instrument,
does not target the macroeconomic conditions of individual countries, and, obviously,
neither does it target the economic conditions of specific regions within each country.
Those constraints on fiscal policy, at the national level, and of the monetary policy, at
the Eurozone level, raise challenges for the insulation of regional economies from shocks
such as the variations in interest rates and exchange rates. On top of this, in the Por-
15Bailey and Berkeley (2014) analyses the role of the West Midlands Taskforce in the United Kingdom
in the crisis of 2008-2009.
18
tuguese economy, the definition and implementation of policies at the regional and local
levels are limited by the scarce resources available at those levels of administration.
The level of fiscal decentralization is an indicator of the share of responsibilities
between the different levels of government (Kyriacou et al., 2017). It is usually measured
by the ratio between local government expenditures and total public expenditures. In
fact, that measure for several OECD countries shows that Portugal is one of the most
centralized countries in OCDE. In 2016, Portugal recorded a 9.5% ratio of financial
decentralization, only ahead of countries such as Luxembourg, Bulgaria, Romania and
Greece and far away from the 35.1% of Germany, the 33.2% of Spain and the 27.6% of
Denmark, the first non-federal country.16
According to Eurostat data for Portugal, in 2016, local governments were responsible
for 12.7% of total public expenditures, recovering from a minimum low of 11.5% in
2014.17 The maximum level of fiscal decentralization occurred in 2008, when the share of
expenditures by the local government reached up to 15.7%. This data shows that, during
the recession that followed the international financial crisis and the Euro sovereign
crisis, a lower share of total public expenditure was distributed to local governments.
This very low share of local government expenditure suggests that local and regional
administration have limited resources to counter the effects of strong aggregate shocks.
In the period 2008–2016, local governments’ total revenues declined from a maximum
of 7,884 million euro, in 2014, to a minimum of 6,979 million euro, in 2014 (a 11.5%
decrease). In 2016, total revenues had recovered 4.6%, to 7,303. The revenues of the
local administration can be divided into transfers from the central government and own
revenues. The evolution of the two components is displayed in Figure 9 for the period
2008–2016. Transfers from the central government reached a maximum in 2010 – 3,800
million euro – declining steadily henceforth, reaching 3,000 million Euro in 2016, a
decrease of 23%. The Financial Equilibrium Fund (FEF), also represented in Figure
9, is main component of central government’s transfers to municipalities. Between
2008 and 2016, FEF varied from a minimum of 64% of total transfers, in 2012, to a
maximum of 78%, in 2016. In this period, FEF reached a maximum of 2,718 million
euro, in 2009 and a minimum of 2,189 million euro in 2014 (a decrease of 24%). FEF
aims at providing municipalities with the funds necessary for them to comply with their
responsabilities, as defined by law.18
As local government faced a substantial reduction in the resources transfered from
16The data is available at IMF (2017).
17In Portugal, local governments are composed by 278 municipalities in the Continent and by two
regional governments in the archipelagoes of Azores (which includes 19 municipalities) and Madeira
(which includes 11 municipalities).
18See Regime Jur´ıdico das Autarquias Locais, Lei 75/2013 12 de setembro de 2013,
http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?artigo_id=selected&nid=1990&
tabela=leis&pagina=1&ficha=1&nversao=.
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the central government, they had to focus on their own capabilities to raise revenues.
Own revenues of local governments depend, on the one hand, on the economic charac-
teristics of the regions and, on the other hand, on their policy choices. Own Revenues
components are described in equation (1),
OwnRevi,t = αi,tPublicServicesi,t + δi,tIncomei,t
+Ωi,tCorporationProfiti,t + γi,tRealEstatePropi,t
+σRealEstateTransi,t + θMobilityi,t (1)
According to equation (1), own revenues of local governments include: (1) the sales
of goods and services supplied locally (PublicServicesi,t), where αi,t represents the price
defined by local entities; (2) revenues from the personal income tax (Incomei,t), where
δi,t stands for the tax rate defined by local entities and bounded between 0% and 5%; (3)
the revenues over the firms’ profits (CorporationProfiti,t), that may reach a maximum
tax rate of 1.5% (Ωi,t); (4) the revenues from real estate property (RealEstatePropi,t),
where the tax rate may be settled between 0.3% and 0.45% (γi,t);
19 (5) additionally,
local government get revenues from taxes on sales of real estate (RealEstateTransi,t)
and taxes on the use of motor vehicles (Mobilityi,t); in both cases tax rates (σ,θ) are
set by the Central Government.
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Figure 9: Local Governments: Own Revenues, Financial Equilibrium Fund and Total
Revenues
19The equity value is obtained through an administrative evaluation that obeys legal criteria estab-
lished by the services of the Ministry of Finance. The actual market value at which the transaction is
made is not taken into account.
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Figure 9 shows a decrease of own revenues of local governments from 4,400 million
Euro in 2008 to 3,700 million Euro in 2013 (-16%). Since 2013, own revenues have
increased steadily, almost recovering the value of 2008. In 2016, as a result of the
described trends in transfers and own revenues, the share of those two components in
total revenues of local governments was 40% and 60%, respectively.
Figure 10 shows the weight of own revenues over total revenues for NUTS III regions,
for 2008 and 2016. That ratio was computed as an average of the ratio of own revenues
to total revenues of the municipalities that belong to each NUTS III region. The great
majority of the regions display an increase in the weight of their own revenues. Only the
regions of AM Porto, Lez´ıria do Tejo and Alentejo Central have experienced a minor
drop in the weight of own revenues. Regions show a wide range of weights on total
revenues, from a maximum of 78% in the AM Lisboa region to a minimum of 29% in
the Baixo Alentejo region.
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
(%
)
AM
 Li
sbo
a
Al
gar
ve
AM
 Po
rto
Oe
ste
Re
giã
o d
e A
vei
ro
Re
giã
o d
e L
eir
ia Av
e
Re
giã
o d
e C
oim
bra
Cá
vad
o
Al
ent
ejo 
Lito
ral
Al
to 
Mi
nh
o
Mé
dio
 Te
jo
Le
zír
ia 
do
 Te
jo
Vi
seu
 D
ão 
La
fõe
s
Tâ
me
ga 
e S
ou
sa
Al
to 
Tâ
me
ga
Do
uro
Be
ira
s e
 Se
rra
 da
 Es
tre
la
Be
ira
 Ba
ixa
Al
ent
ejo 
Cen
tral
Al
to 
Al
ent
ejo
Te
rra
s d
e T
rás
−o
s−M
on
tes
Ba
ixo
 A
len
tejo
2008 2016
Source: Direcc¸a˜o-Geral das Autarquias Locais (DGAL) and INE.
Figure 10: Variation of the weight of Own Revenues
The variation in the weight of the own revenues, described in Figure 10, reflects
the capabilities of the regions to raise taxes over real estate, personal income and
corporations’ profits. The ability of local governments in each region to raise own
revenues, namely in the context of decreasing government transfers, may foster the
autonomy of local governments and enhance the resilience of regions to shocks. On
21
the other hand, own revenues will be highly correlated with the regions’ own business
cycle, which may condition its ability to deal with specific shocks. In that case, transfers
from the central government may be more effective in dampening the region’s business
cycle. Regions’ greater fiscal autonomy also provides local officials with greater decision-
making power to design policy options that best serve their constituencies. In the same
way, greater financial autonomy can foster the quality of local governance. Additionally,
a commitment to decentralization allows for a better identification of the services to
be provided with the needs of the community it actually aims to serve – for a detailed
discussion of the benefits of decentralization see, for example, Kyriacou et al. (2017),
Treisman (2006) and Oates (1999).
In Table 4 we can see that overall the weight of the total revenues over GDP has
little variation during the period of analysis. From 4.3% of the GDP in 2008, it dropped
to 4.2% in 2016 after recording a small increase in 2012 (4.6%). What has significantly
changed is its composition. Transfers from the central government dropped during the
crisis and did not recover afterwards (2012-2016), while own revenues fully recovered
after recording a drop in the period 2008-2012.
The variation in the central government’s transfers is similar across regions. Only
the region of AM Lisboa experienced a drop in both periods. The variation of the own
revenues was uneven across regions. Some regions recorded a wider increment in its
variation (Alto Taˆmega, Terras de Tra´s-os-Montes, Alto Minho) and others experienced
a drop from which they are still striving to recover (Beiras e Serra da Estrela, Me´dio
Tejo, Lez´ırias do Tejo).
In the next section, we estimate the impact of total revenues, FEF and own revenues
of local governments’ on regional GDP growth. Additionally, we will explore the role of
the autonomy of local policies, gauged by the weight of own revenues on total revenues
of municipalities, on the the regions’ GDP growth.
5 Empirical analysis
The evidence presented in Section 2 suggested that, in the period following the inter-
national financial crisis, the aggregate divergence of the Portuguese economy coincided
with significant regional σ – convergence. In this section, we use longitudinal data for
the 23 Portuguese mainland NUTS III regions, for the period 2008–2016, to estimate a
model that aims at identifying the determinants of the asymmetric economic dynam-
ics that resulted in strong regional convergence. The econometric specification follows
Durlauf et al. (2009), which allows us to test the papers’ hypotheses: (i) was there β –
convergence in GDP per capita across regions? (ii) regions with a higher debt-to-GDP
ratio went through a deeper and longer recession? (iii) regions with a higher degree
22
Table 4: Descriptive statistics: variations (%)
TotRev/GDP ∆OwnRev ∆FEF
NUTS III 2008 2012 2016 2008 – 2012 2012 – 2016 2008 – 2012 2012 – 2016
Portugal 4.3 4.6 4.2 -10.1 11.2 -11.9 0.6
Alentejo Central 7.2 7.4 8.6 -12.4 22.3 -11.0 3.0
Alentejo Litoral 5.0 5.9 4.4 -10.2 2.5 -11.0 2.7
Algarve 7.0 6.3 6.9 -26.9 32.7 -19.4 -1.6
Alto Alentejo 11.2 10.5 8.9 -13.0 11.6 -11.5 2.2
Alto Minho 7.1 7.2 6.2 -6.6 29.9 -11.6 2.4
Alto Taˆmega 9.8 10.6 10.6 -1.5 36.5 -10.7 3.3
Ave 4.5 5.1 4.3 -4.5 18.7 -11.4 5.0
Baixo Alentejo 8.5 8.1 7.1 -9.1 -1.1 -10.5 2.5
Beira Baixa 8.9 7.9 6.8 -7.4 1.2 -10.9 2.5
Beiras e Serra da Estrela 9.9 9.1 8.5 -13.7 4.6 -10.6 2.8
Ca´vado 3.9 4.1 3.5 -12.2 14.2 -10.6 3.9
Douro 9.2 9.3 7.6 4.7 15.6 -11.1 4.1
Lez´ıria do Tejo 5.7 5.2 5.1 -38.0 17.7 -10.7 3.2
Me´dio Tejo 6.1 6.5 5.1 -28.3 5.1 -17.3 2.1
Oeste 4.8 5.0 4.2 -16.7 13.1 -11.2 2.3
Regia˜o de Aveiro 4.4 4.4 3.6 -11.3 25.3 -11.0 -0.0
Regia˜o de Coimbra 4.6 5.2 4.7 -8.0 15.9 -10.4 2.0
Regia˜o de Leiria 4.2 4.2 3.7 -11.4 23.7 -12.1 4.7
Terras de Tra´s-os-Montes 9.3 10.3 9.3 5.2 22.5 -11.5 3.0
Taˆmega e Sousa 5.7 6.1 5.1 -9.9 13.7 -10.7 4.4
Viseu Da˜o Lafo˜es 6.1 6.0 5.5 -25.4 20.7 -9.1 1.1
A´rea Metropolitana de Lisboa 2.7 3.3 2.9 4.5 -2.2 -13.9 -12.0
A´rea Metropolitana do Porto 3.8 3.5 3.6 -23.8 25.1 -10.4 2.2
Notes: ‘TotRev’ and ‘OwnRev’ stand for NUTS III’s Total and Own Revenues, while ‘FEF ’ stands
for Financial Equilibrium Fund (Fundo de Equil´ıbrio Financeiro). NUTS stands for Nomenclatura das
Unidades Territoriais para Fins Estat´ısticos and corresponds to the ‘Nomenclature of Territorial Units
for Statistics’ developed by Eurostat.
Sources: Own computations using data from Direcc¸a˜o-Geral das Autarquias Locais (DGAL) and INE.
of openness to trade had a better economic performance in terms of economic growth?
(iv) what was the role of fiscal decentralization, namely through local governments’ own
revenues, on regions’ economic performance?
We start by describing the data and then we present our econometric strategy and
results.
5.1 The data
In our estimates we use yearly longitudinal data for the 23 Portuguese mainland NUTS
III regions, for the period 2008–2016. We use regions’ real GDP per capita, GDPpc,
from Contas Regionais, INE, as a measure of economic performance. We built a novel
data set using detailed information on households’ and firms’s debt at the regional
level, from the Central Credit Responsability Database (CCRD), Banco de Portugal.
We use this data to build debt-to-GDP ratios at the regional level, Debtratio. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to use this data at the regional level.
The regions’ degree of openness to trade is mesasured by the ratio of exports to GDP,
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Exportsratio, from Anua´rios Estat´ısticos Regionais, INE. To evaluate the role of fiscal
decentralization on regions’ growth rates we use local government’s revenues data from
DGAL and INE, aggregated at NUTS III regions’ level. In our estimates we evaluate the
impact of local governments’ total revenues per capita, TotRevpc, and of its two main
components: the Own Revenues per capita, OwnRevpc, and the Financial Equilibrium
Fund per capita, FEFpc. Additionally, to evaluate the importance of the regions’ fiscal
autonomy on economic growth, in our estimates we also consider the regions’ ratio of
own revenues over total revenues, OwnRevratio, and the regions’ ratio of the Financial
Equilibrium Fund over total revenues, FEFratio. We also include in our model, as
control variables, the region’s investment rate, Inv, and the percentage change in the
regions’ employment, Emp, from Anua´rios Estat´ısticos Regionais, INE. Finally, the
variables Interest, given by the long term government bond yields (10 years) and
the real effective exchange rate, Exchange, are collected from Eurostat (2018b) and
AMECO (2018), respectively. Table A2 reports descriptive statistics of the variables
used in our estimates.
5.2 Econometric model and estimation strategy
Given our testable hypotheses and the definition of the variables presented in the pre-
vious section, we evaluate the existence of β – convergence, the impact of indebtedness,
openness to trade and of fiscal decentralization on regional GDP growth using a general
econometric model with the following specification:
GDP i,t = α GDP i,t−1 + β1 Inv i,t−1 + β2 ∆Emp i,t
+β3 Debt i,t + β4 Debt ratio i,t × Interest t
+β5 Exports i,t + β6 Exports i,t × Exchange t
+γ X i,t + ηi + εi,t, (2)
where the vectorXi,t is TotRevpc i,t in our Model # 1; includes the variablesOwnRevpc i,t
and FEF pc i,t in Model # 2; is OwnRevratio i,t in Model # 3; and, finally, is FEFratio i,t
in Model # 4. With the exception of the interest rate and the exchange rate, all other
variables are in logs.
In our estimates, we account for the possibility that the effect of debt-to-GDP ratio
on GDP is conditional on the interest rate at the country level, Interestt, by including
in equation (2) an interaction between the debt-to-GDP ratio and the interest rate.
Likewise, we include an interaction term between the exports-to-GDP ratio and the
real effective exchange rate for the Portuguese economy, Exchanget. Finally, in order
to control for NUTS III regions unobserved heterogeneity, we consider a region specific
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effect, ηi, and a white noise error term, εi,t.
We apply panel data estimation procedures to the longitudinal data described above
to obtain estimates for equation (2). The use of a fixed-effects estimator would introduce
an endogeneity problem, namely by creating a non-zero covariance between the within
transformed GDPi,t−1 and the demeaned εi,t.20 To address endogeneity issues we follow
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) and apply the System–GMM
estimator to the dynamic panel data model specified in equation (2). We assume
that the variables Interest and Exchange are treated as exogenous (the remaining
variables are treated as endogenous). Given the short number of observations, we
use second and third lags of the endogenous variables as instruments for the first-
difference equation. For the level equation we applied the usual lagged first-differenced
variables as instruments. The exogenous variables are also included in the instrument
set. Furthermore, to limit the overall number of instruments, we apply the ‘collapsed’
instruments as discussed in Roodman (2009). In the computation of the variance-
covariance matrix we use the two-step estimation with the finite-sample correction
proposed by Windmeijer (2005). The statistics reported in Table 5 are robust to errors’
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Finally, we report the Hansen consistent test
for over-identifying restrictions.21
5.3 Results
The results of our estimates are presented in Table 5.22 Regional β – convergence is
confirmed in Models # 1 to # 4. The estimated α is below one and bounded between
0.62 and 0.75 and is always statistically significant at the 1% significance level.
Concerning the three hypotheses of the paper, our findings are the following. In the
first place, we found that the debt-to-GDP ratio has a negative effect on the region’s
economic growth. Using the results of Model # 3, the combination of the parameters
associated with the debt to GDP ratio, β3 and β4, in equation (2), shows that a 10
p.p. increase in the Debtratio leads to a 0.4% decrease in GDP.
23 Furthermore, a 1 p.p.
increase in the interest rate magnifies the immediate effect by about 0.01 p.p. (statis-
tically significant at the 1%). These results corroborate the hypothesis that a higher
debt-to-GDP ratio, in the context of more stringent financial conditions, captured by
higher interest rates, has a negative effect on the regions’ economic growth.
20For a detailed discussion, see, for example, Verbeek (2012)’s Chapter 10. Further insight can be
found in Arellano (2003).
21For further insights on the use of this methodology see, for example, Costa et al. (2015), who use
this estimator to analyse interactions in Portuguese municipalities’ spending decisions.
22For a discussion of the validity of the estimates see Section A.2 in the Appendix.
23The marginal effect is evaluated at the interest rate in 2016, 3.2%, and is statistically significant
at the 10% level. Its standard-error, computed by the delta method, is 0.002.
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Table 5: Estimation results: System – GMM
M #1 M #2 M #3 M #4
ln(GDPpc)i,t−1 0.7483*** 0.7450*** 0.6212*** 0.7502***
(0.0453) (0.0239) (0.0536) (0.0350)
ln(Debtratio)i,t -0.0174 -0.0243 -0.0372 -0.0308
(0.0311) (0.0198) (0.0231) (0.0222)
ln(Debtratio)i,t × IntRatet -0.0019*** -0.0019*** -0.0015*** -0.0018***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ln(Exportsratio)i,t 0.1414* 0.0675 0.2124** 0.0714**
(0.0740) (0.0409) (0.0789) (0.0282)
ln(Exportsratio)i,t × ExRatet -0.0015** -0.0008** -0.0022*** -0.0008***
(0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0002)
ln(TotRevpc)i,t -0.0853***
(0.0224)
ln(OwnRevpc)i,t 0.0119
(0.0294)
ln(FEFpc)i,t -0.0432***
(0.0066)
ln(OwnRevratio)i,t 0.0996***
(0.0259)
ln(FEFratio)i,t -0.0553***
(0.0090)
AR(1) -1.709 -1.882 -2.026 -2.019
AR(1)− pv 0.087 0.060 0.043 0.044
AR(2) -1.417 -1.602 -1.488 -1.519
AR(2)− pv 0.156 0.109 0.137 0.129
Hansen χ2 17.223 19.664 18.079 18.888
Hansen (df) 12 14 12 12
Hansen, p− value 0.141 0.141 0.113 0.091
Notes: The dependent variable is ln(GDPi,t). All models are estimated by System–GMM
(all the models include as control variables Invi,t−1 and ∆Empi,t as regressors). Robust
standard-errors in parenthesis and clustered at NUTS III level. Significance levels: 1%,
***; 5%, **; 10%, *. Sample size: 184 observations, 23 NUTS III and 8 time periods.
The variables are described in Section 5.1. AR(1) and AR(2) stand for the Arellano-Bond
tests for first and second order autocorrelation in the first differences of the idiosyncratic
disturbance term, ∆εi,t; pv stands for p-value, while df is degrees of freedom. Hansen
refers to the test for joint validity of the instruments. Table A1 provides additional
information on each NUTS III region. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table A2.
See the discussion in the main text for further information.
Concerning our second hypothesis, our results show that openness to trade, mea-
sured by the weight of exports on the region’s GDP, has a positive impact on GDP,
and that effect is magnified by an exchange rate depreciation, has shown in the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term between the export ratio and the real effective exchange
rate. This parameter is always negative (an increase in the exchange rate represents an
appreciation of the domestic currency) and highly significant at 1% level in Model #
3 and at 5% level in the other models. The estimated parameters imply that a 1 p.p.
depreciation in the exchange rate increases the immediate effect on GDP per capita
growth by approximately 0.06 pp (statistically significant at 1%). These results are
confirm the findings of Petrakos and Psycharis (2015) for Greece. OECD (2018) also
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mention that regions with a higher specialization in the tradable sector converged faster
to the most richest regions.
Finally, our last hypothesis deals with the impact of fiscal decentralization on the
regions’ economic growth, considering total revenues of the municipalities and its main
components. Our results show that local governments’ total revenues have a negative,
and significant at the 1% level, impact on regions’ economic growth (Model # 1). This
somewhat surprising result suggests that total revenues may be ill-conceived. Therefore,
we investigate further the role of local government’s revenues by looking at the effects
of its two main components: own revenues and the financial equilibrium fund (FEF).
Model # 2 shows that own revenues are positive, but statistically not significant, while
FEF has a negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level, impact on economic
growth. These results reinforce the need of further investigation on the design and
effectiveness of local governments’ revenues, namely in the context of a severe economic
crisis.
In the previous section we have discussed the potential benefits of local governments’
fiscal autonomy. In Models # 3 and # 4, we evaluate the impact of increasing the fiscal
scope for municipalities, measured by the weight of own revenues in their total revenues.
Our results suggest that local governments’ with a higher weight of own revenues have
a better economic performance – a 1 p.p. increase in the weight of own revenues is
associated with a 0.22% increase in GDP (statistically significant at 1%). Reinforcing
this result, estimates of Model # 4 show that a higher weight of central government’s
transfers (FEF) have a negative, and statistically significant at the 1% level, effect on
the regions’ economic growth: a 1 p.p. increase in weight of FEF over total revenues is
associated with a 0.14% decrease in GDP (statistically significant at 1%).
We then run two additional robustness estimations. First, given the weight of AM
Lisboa region, the capital’s city region, on the economy, we excluded it from our esti-
mates. By running the same regressions as in Table 5, but excluding AM Lisboa from
the sample, the results were highly stable in terms of sign, magnitude and validity (the
AR(1), AR(2) and Hansen test do not reject the validity of the instruments).
The second robustness check deals with the definition of own revenues, which could
reveal itself as a source of extra-endogeneity not entirely solved within the System–
GMM estimation strategy. To proceed along this line of discussion, we have considered
own revenues excluding income based taxes, IRS and derrama, and re-estimated Model
# 3. The results do not reject the validity of the main results reported under column
M# 3.
Finally, we explored if the results could be driven by hand-picking the set of instru-
ments we use. This is a key critique to the Dynamic System–GMM, as its results could
be highly sensitive to the specific instruments one uses. Maintaining our assumptions
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on model formulation, particularly the assumptions on endogeneity and exogeneity, we
have estimated model M#5 with different sets of instruments by using different lags.
All the results we obtain are consistent with the ones reported in column M#5.24
6 Concluding remarks
This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of the spatial impact of
the international financial crisis. The identification of the determinants of the regions’
economic dynamics during the financial and economic crisis may contribute to the
design of better policies, that is, policies that take into account the specific conditions
of the regions. This may result in more resilient regions and in a stronger aggregate
performance of the economy.
During the economic cycle that started with the international financial crisis of 2008,
the aggregate divergence in real GDP per capita relative to the EU–28 coincided with a
strong regional GDP per capita convergence. In fact, in the period 2008–2015, Portugal
stands out as the EU–28 country with highest decrease in GDP per capita regional
inequality. We then explored the relation of the regional dynamics with two important
economic drivers in this business cycle of recession and recovery: debt and exports.
Economic literature suggests that regions with higher debt-to-GDP ratios should have
a more severe recession and a weaker recovery, given the impact of financial constraints
on households’ consumption and firms’ investment decisions. Our estimates corroborate
that hypothesis, showing that more indebted regions had a worse economic performance
following the international financial crisis. Such effects were magnified by variations in
the interest rates.
The high share of non-tradable sectors has been among the main culprits of the
low-growth regime of the Portuguese economy in the 21st century. In the context of a
strong contraction in domestic demand and a fiscal consolidation process, exports were
crucial, both as an engine of economic growth and in the correction of current account
imbalances. The economic literature has shown that real effective exchange rates have
an impact in economic growth. This impact is magnified in open economies specialized
in low-tech sectors. Our estimates suggest that regions more open to international trade
were more resilient to the contraction in domestic demand and were more capable of
benefiting from the recovery of the international economy and from real exchange rate
depreciations.
In this paper, we also show the existence of asynchronous regional business cycles.
In this context, we explored the role of local governments’ own revenues in regions’
economic growth. Our estimates indicate that the increase in fiscal autonomy of local
24Detailed results are available upon request.
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governments, measured by the weight of own revenues on total revenues, may enhance
the regions’ resilience and growth.
It also follows from the discussion above that regions’ economic performance may
benefit from a more decentralized structure of governance, based on own revenues,
as long as it is framed by a stringent control over local governments’ indebtedness.
Furthermore, regions’ transition from bust to recovery could be accelerated by policies
that promote tradable sectors.
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A Appendix
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Table A1: Descriptive statistics by NUTS III, Portugal mainland, 2016
NUTS III
GDP per
capita
Share
GDP
Share
Pop.
Pop.
Dens.
# Municipalities:
Pop. over 50k
# Munici-
palities
# Parishes
Alentejo Central 15,802 1.4% 1.6% 22 1 14 69
Alentejo Litoral 26,398 1.4% 1.0% 18 0 5 31
Algarve 18,854 4.7% 4.5% 90 3 16 67
Alto Alentejo 14,216 0.9% 1.1% 18 0 15 69
Alto Minho 13,787 1.8% 2.4% 108 1 10 208
Alto Taˆmega 12,021 0.6% 0.9% 31 0 6 118
A´rea Metropolitana de Lisboa 23,578 37.6% 28.8% 1003 16 18 118
A´rea Metropolitana do Porto 16,913 16.5% 17.5% 849 12 17 173
Ave 15,305 3.6% 4.2% 288 3 8 168
Baixo Alentejo 16,995 1.1% 1.2% 14 0 13 62
Beira Baixa 16,512 0.8% 0.8% 18 1 6 59
Beiras e Serra da Estrela 12,429 1.5% 2.2% 35 1 15 266
Ca´vado 14,559 3.3% 4.1% 329 2 6 170
Douro 13,200 1.4% 2.0% 49 1 19 217
Lez´ıria do Tejo 15,164 2.1% 2.4% 57 1 11 68
Me´dio Tejo 15,171 2.0% 2.4% 72 0 13 93
Oeste 14,807 3.0% 3.6% 162 3 12 89
Regia˜o de Aveiro 17,482 3.6% 3.7% 222 2 11 74
Regia˜o de Coimbra 16,255 4.0% 4.5% 103 2 19 168
Regia˜o de Leiria 18,114 2.9% 2.9% 118 2 10 67
Taˆmega e Sousa 11,239 2.7% 4.3% 233 5 11 177
Terras de Tra´s-os-Montes 14,377 0.9% 1.1% 20 0 9 195
Viseu Da˜o Lafo˜es 13,956 2.0% 2.6% 80 1 14 156
Source: Own computations using data from Eurostat, European Commission and Statistics Portugal (INE). GDP per capita
is in Euro. ‘Pop.’ stands for population; ‘Dens.’ is density; ‘50k’ represents fifty thousand inhabitants; # represents the
number of observations, either municipalities or parishes. In 2015, mainland Portugal has 278 Municipalities and 2,882
parishes.
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics
GDP pc ∆GDP pc Inv Emp Debtratio Exportsratio TotRevpc OwnRevpc FEFpc OwnRevratio FEFratio
2009
Mean 15241.1 -0.4 11.8 3.7 144.5 16.9 1025.6 350.3 408.8 0.36 0.38
sd 3310.2 4.2 2.3 1.2 22.3 10.8 302.1 140.0 203.5 0.13 0.11
Min 10519.1 -15.7 7.1 1.9 105.6 1.2 586.9 192.5 121.1 0.19 0.16
Max 25678.8 6.8 17.9 6.4 186.1 44.5 1446.3 824.1 772.1 0.69 0.53
2012
Mean 13945.4 -5.6 7.4 2.9 140.5 25.3 883.3 326.1 351.7 0.39 0.38
sd 2917.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 20.6 14.0 252.9 109.9 178.8 0.13 0.11
Min 9809.0 -11.2 3.6 0.0 101.8 2.0 510.6 187.3 101.0 0.24 0.14
Max 22169.0 0.9 13.3 7.0 177.8 57.5 1261.6 682.7 668.2 0.75 0.53
2016
Mean 15865.9 3.0 7.9 8.1 111.1 30.8 906.1 390.3 376.5 0.45 0.40
sd 3429.1 1.2 1.8 1.4 16.0 22.2 284.1 136.2 199.0 0.14 0.13
Min 11171.0 0.2 5.0 4.6 76.0 2.0 506.0 218.5 88.9 0.29 0.13
Max 26238.5 4.9 12.0 11.3 134.6 107.1 1350.5 913.7 720.8 0.78 0.60
Notes: GDPpc is expressed in Euro; all other numbers are expressed as percentages. ‘sd’ stands for standard-deviation; ‘Min’
for minimum and ‘Max’ for maximum. In each year the number of observations is 23, corresponding to the number of NUTS
III. The sample used to compute these statistics is the same as the one used in the regressions presented in Table 5.
Sources: Own computations using data from AMECO, Banco de Portugal, Eurostat and INE.
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A.2 Discussion of the validity of the estimates in Table 5
Following Arellano and Bond (1991) we evaluate the validity of the instrument set
using the statistics AR(1), AR(2) and the Hansen test. Looking to Model # 1, we
observe that the AR(1) test, with a statistic of -1.71, is statistically different from
0 at the 10% significance level, which indicates that we reject the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation in the first-difference residual, ∆εi,t. Looking to the AR(2) test,
we do not reject the null of absence of correlation between ∆εi,t and ∆εi,t−2. This
implies that there is no serial correlation in εi,t, validating the use of lags 2 and more of
the endogenous variables in equation (2). Furthermore, the (robust) Hansen statistic,
χ2(12) of 17.2, is statistically non-significant. This set of results lead us to conclude
in favour of the validity of our estimates. As discussed in Arellano (2003), we take
an additional step and evaluate if using the System–GMM, as discussed in Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), improves on the First–Differences
solution discussed in Arellano and Bond (1991). The Difference–in–Hansen tests for
the validity of the additional instruments used in System–GMM, as compared to the
First–Differences set of instruments, do not reject the null that the First–Differences of
the added set of instruments are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. Relevant statistics:
(1) GMM instruments for levels, Hansen test excluding group, χ2(6) = 11.92 (p-value =
0.06 ), Difference (null, exogeneity), χ2(6) = 5.30 (p-value = 0.51 ); (2) IV for exogenous
variables, exchange rate and interest rate, Hansen test excluding group, χ2(10) = 17.02
(p-value = 0.07 ), Difference (null, exogeneity), χ2(2) = 0.20 (p-value = 0.91 ). Such result
is an extra validation of our estimates. These conclusions extend to the estimates of
Models # 2, # 3 and # 4 presented in Table 5.
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